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Abstract 
A shift towards non-agricultural activities is widely viewed as a key component of 
European economic growth during the early modern Little Divergence. Yet little is 
known about this process in those eastern-central European economies that 
experienced the expansion of landlord powers under the ‘second serfdom’. We 
analyze non-agricultural activity under the second serfdom using data on 6,983 
villages in Bohemia (the Czech lands) in 1654. Bohemia resembled other eastern-
central, nordic and southern European economies in having a lower intensity of non-
agricultural activity than western Europe. But Bohemian serfs engaged in a wide array 
of industrial and commercial activities whose intensity varied significantly with 
village characteristics. Non-agricultural activity showed a significant positive 
relationship with village size, pastoral agriculture, sub-peasant social strata, Jews, 
freemen, female household heads, and village mills, and a significant negative 
relationship with arable agriculture, large peasant holdings, and towns. It manifested a 
curvilinear relationship with the ‘second serfdom’, as proxied by landlord presence on 
village holdings. Landlord presence in villages also reversed the positive effects of 
female household headship and mills on non-agricultural activities. Under the second 
serfdom, landlords encouraged serf activities from which they could extract rents, 
while stifling others which threatened manorial interests. 
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Occupational Structure in the Czech Lands under the Second Serfdom1 
Alexander Klein and Sheilagh Ogilvie 
I 
Changes in occupational structure – particularly a shift away from agriculture towards 
industry and services – are widely viewed as indicators of economic growth. Debates about 
the early modern ‘Little Divergence’, during which the economies of northwest Europe are 
thought to have decisively pulled ahead of the east and south, centre partly on rival estimates 
of the size of the non-agricultural sector.2 A high density of non-agricultural occupations, 
such as the 60 per cent observed in the seventeenth-century Netherlands,3 are viewed as 
indicating that agricultural productivity had risen enough to release labour and that 
specialization was enhancing efficiency and work incentives.4 Many studies emphasize that 
                                                            
1 We would like to thank Lenka Matušíková, Pavla Jirková, and Helena Klímová for generous help with 
historical data sources and useful discussions of the Berní Rula; Josef Grulich and Eduard Maur for illuminating 
conversations about the economic history of early modern Bohemia; Leigh Shaw-Taylor and Tony Wrigley for 
their insights into occupational structure; Steve Broadberry, Tracy Dennison, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and three 
anonymous referees for stimulating comments on earlier drafts; and seminar participants at LSE, Caltech, the 
EHS 2013 meeting in York, and the EHES 2013 meeting in London for helpful feedback. We gratefully 
acknowledge financial support from the Professor Dame Elizabeth Hill Fund at the University of Cambridge; 
the British Academy Small Research Grant Scheme; the Collaborative Project HIPOD, supported by the 
European Commission's 7th Framework Programme for Research, Contract Number SSH7-CT-2008-225342; 
and the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, Grant Number 13-138485. Alexander Klein Snr, Lucie 
Matějková, and Václav Žďárek provided excellent research assistance. This project builds on the lifelong work 
of the late Václav Červený and we are grateful to him for allowing us to build upon the data he collected. 
2 Broadberry, Campbell and Van Leeuwen, ‘When’; Clark, ‘1381’. 
3 De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, pp. 525, 527. 
4 Crafts, ‘British industrialization’; De Vries, Industrious revolution; Allen, British industrial revolution. 
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rural non-agricultural activities, even those oriented mainly to local markets, can fuel 
economic growth via specialization and consumption linkages.5 Occupational structure in 
general and rural non-agricultural intensification in particular are thus important economic 
indicators. 
Despite the theoretical role ascribed to non-agricultural activities, we still lack 
quantitative evidence of their importance in many European economies during the ‘Little 
Divergence’. Economic historians are gradually compiling data for northwest Europe, 
particularly England and the Netherlands, but have hardly touched upon slower-growing 
economies. In particular, little is known of occupational structure in those many central and 
eastern European economies that experienced the intensification of landlord powers over the 
rural population under the early modern ‘second serfdom’.6 
This paper addresses that gap by investigating occupational structure in seventeenth-
century Bohemia (the modern Czech Republic). Although some older literature argued that 
the Bohemian second serfdom was unusually mild and only began after 1648, most scholars 
now acknowledge that from c. 1550 (and possibly earlier), Bohemian landlords increased 
extraction of money rents and labour services, extended such burdens to new economic 
activities, intensified market monopolies, and imposed heavier constraints on their serfs’ 
economic and demographic decisions.7 This did not mean that market exchange was absent: 
early modern Bohemian serfs participated actively in markets for labour, capital, land, and 
agricultural and industrial output including grain, cattle, timber, beer, wine, dairy products, 
                                                            
5 Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon, Transforming. 
6 For pioneering work on eighteenth-century Bohemian occupational structure, however, see Cerman, ‘Labour-
intensive proto-industrialization’. 
7 Maur, Český komorní velkostatek; Donth, Rochlitz; Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’; Cerman, 
‘Gutsherrschaft’; Melton, ‘Population structure’; Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’; Klein, ‘Institutions’. 
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yarn, textiles, shingles, and many other products.8 But these serf market transactions were 
circumscribed by manorial rent extraction. Bohemian landlords constrained labour markets 
directly by extorting coerced labour services and indirectly by enforcing restrictions on 
geographical mobility, marriage, apprenticeship, household formation, and settlement. They 
constrained land markets by expanding the manorial demesne, prohibiting partition of serf 
holdings, and regulating sales, inheritance, rentals, and mortgages of serf holdings. And they 
constrained output markets by enforcing manorial purchasing prerogatives, granting 
privileges to merchants and craftsmen, and imposing demesne monopolies over key 
consumption goods such as beer and spirits.9  
This thoroughgoing manorial rent-extraction meant that before Emancipation in 1781, 
Bohemia had little claim to be a prosperous economy. It suffered from high risks, grinding 
poverty, and starvation for some of the poorest. Living standards, as measured by life 
expectancies, were low by European standards.10 After Emancipation, Bohemia developed 
                                                            
8 Maur, Český komorní velkostatek; Klíma, Manufakturní ; Klíma, ‘Industrial development’; Klíma, ‘English 
merchant capital’; Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’; Melton, ‘Population structure’, pp. 316, 318; Ogilvie, 
‘Economic world’; Ogilvie, ‘Communities’; Ogilvie, ‘Staat’; Ogilvie, ‘Village community’. 
9 Klíma, ‘Agrarian class structure’, p. 53; Maur, Český komorní velkostatek; Blum, End, p. 165 (on beer); 
Petráň, ‘Höhepunkt’, pp. 332-4; Donth, Rochlitz, pp. 12, 241-2, 334-9, 349, 479; Cerman, ‘Proto-
industrialisierung’, pp. 88-109; Cerman, ‘Gutsherrschaft’, pp. 92-5; Stejskal, ‘Bauer’, pp. 211-14; Melton, 
‘Population structure’, pp. 315-25; Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, pp. 436-47; Ogilvie, ‘Village community’, p. 
406; Ogilvie and Edwards, ‘Women’; Klein, ‘Institutions’. 
10 Cerman, ‘Bohemia’, pp. 154-9; Grulich and Zeitlhofer, ‘Lebensformen’, p. 31; Zeitlhofer, ‘Besitztransfer’, 
pp. 119-20; Zeitlhofer, Besitzwechsel, pp. 39, 66, 71, 126-7, 149-50, 163-6, 210, 217, 232, 290-3, 303-6; 
Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, p. 451. 
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into the economic powerhouse of the Habsburg lands, but in the seventeenth century it lay 
definitively on the low-performing side of the ‘Little Divergence’.11  
To explore occupational structure in early modern Bohemia, we analyze a large data 
set drawn from the 1654 Berní Rula, a detailed national tax register. We focus on rural non-
agricultural occupations, since rural non-agricultural activity is an important growth indicator 
and in Bohemia the rural economy comprised most of the labour force. Our findings shed 
light both on the shift away from agriculture during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’ and 
on the broader operation of the European second serfdom.  
II 
But is there any point in analyzing non-agricultural occupations in a serf economy? 
Many scholars portray central and eastern European serfs as having Chayanovian mentalities 
which made them stick to subsistence farming and avoid industry or market exchange.12 
Many others assume that serfdom prevented markets from functioning, stifling occupational 
specialization: landlords prohibited serfs from engaging in crafts or commerce, the theory 
goes, because such non-taxable occupations diverted them from farm-work which paid 
manorial rents and dues.13 If such assumptions were correct, rural economies under the 
                                                            
11 Klíma, Manufakturní ; Klíma, ‘Industrial development’; Klíma, ‘English merchant capital’; Klíma, ‘Role’; 
Klíma, ‘Agrarian class structure’; Míka, Poddaný lid; Petráň, Zemědělská výroba; Petráň, Poddaný lid; Maur, 
‘Poddaní točnického panství’ [part 1]; Maur, ‘Poddaní točnického panství’ [part 2]; Maur, Český komorní 
velkostatek; Maur, ‘Geneze’; Maur, ‘Vývojové etapy’; Maur, ‘Zemědělská výroba’; Janoušek, Historický vývoj; 
Svodoba, ‘Feudální závislost’; Myška, ‘Pre-industrial iron-making’; Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’; Ogilvie, 
‘Communities’; Ogilvie, ‘Staat’; Ogilvie and Edwards, ‘Women’; Klein, ‘Institutions’. 
12 For critical surveys of this view, see Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, pp. 430-5; Dennison, Institutional 
framework, pp. 1-28; Cerman, Villagers, pp. 109-11; Ogilvie, ‘Choices’, pp. 269-78. 
13 Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm, Industrialization, pp. 17-20, , 216-20. 
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second serfdom should have been exclusively agricultural, apart from forced labour by serfs 
in manorial manufactories. 
To investigate these questions, we compiled a large data set from the Berní Rula, a 
detailed tax register drawn up in 1654 to bring the Habsburgs’ Bohemian subjects under 
fiscal control after the Thirty Years War. The Berní Rula was the first national tax register for 
Bohemia and provided the basis for piecemeal ‘revisitations’ in the 1670s and the 
comprehensive Theresian Cadaster in the eighteenth century.14 The Berní Rula registered 
every ‘holding’ (i.e. dwelling plus any land) in 1654, recording whether it was currently 
occupied or vacant, its arable area, its draft animals and other cattle, its current occupier 
(individual, community, or landlord), and the characteristics of individual holders (name, 
gender, social stratum, serf status, and any non-agricultural occupations). The register also 
recorded larger local infrastructure such as mills, ironworks, and breweries.15  
We collected data from the Berní Rula for 7,257 villages on 893 feudal estates, 
encompassing more than 70 per cent of the total area of Bohemia in 1654.16 Of these villages, 
274 lay completely empty so they did not have an occupational structure that could be 
analyzed. For each of the 6,983 occupied villages in our data set, we calculated the share of 
households recorded as practising occupations outside agriculture. These occupations did not 
consist of work by serfs in manorial manufactories. Rather, they were activities undertaken 
by serf households on their own initiative. These ranged from primary-sector occupations 
                                                            
14 On the institutional and political background to Bohemian state taxation and the Berní Rula see: Pekař, České 
katastry; Berní Rula 1; Ogilvie and Cerman, ‘Bohemian census’; Matušíková and Ogilvie, ‘Bohemia’; and Klein 
and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 2-5. 
15 Pekař, České katastry; Berní Rula 1; Červený and Červená, Berní Rula; Ogilvie and Cerman, ‘Bohemian 
census’; Matušíková and Ogilvie, ‘Bohemia’; Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 4, 16, 28, 35-6. 
16 Červený and Červená, Berní Rula, xxii; Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 2-3, 5-6. 
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such as miner and charcoal burner, through secondary-sector ones such as baker, butcher, 
smith, tanner, miller, tailor, and weaver, to tertiary-sector occupations such as merchant, petty 
trader, tavern-keeper, clerk, and teacher.  
The occupations recorded in the Berní Rula, like those in most pre-modern tax 
registers, should be regarded as a minimum measure of non-agricultural activity, since pre-
modern tax systems focused primarily on real estate.17 However, the Berní Rula had no 
reason to under-record non-agricultural activity to a greater extent than other pre-modern 
European fiscal sources. On the contrary, several characteristics of the Berní Rula justify 
regarding the information it contains on rural non-agricultural activity as a reliable minimum 
proxy measure of underlying occupational structure.18 First, the Berní Rula neither rewarded 
nor penalized state tax commissioners, manorial authorities, or serfs themselves for reporting 
non-agricultural activity. Tax liability did not depend on non-agricultural activity, but was 
determined via a standardized unit (the osedly) based on the legal social stratum of the 
landholding, with one osedly defined as equal to one ‘peasant’ holding, four ‘smallholdings’, 
or eight ‘cottager’ holdings; adjustment of tax burdens to take account of holders’ income 
(e.g. from non-agricultural activity) was not envisaged at the time of data collection.19 
Second, the Berní Rula commissioners recorded abundant non-agricultural occupations for 
town-dwellers, despite not being instructed to do so, testifying to their conscientiousness in 
inquiring into taxpayers’ economic circumstances. Third, our statistical tests established that 
the share of non-agricultural occupations recorded was not significantly related to measurable 
characteristics of recording conventions, including the composition of state commissions 
                                                            
17 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 259-325; Zeitlhofer, ‘Besitztransfer’, pp. 49-109; Zeitlhofer, 
Besitzwechsel, pp. 71-9; Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 6-8. 
18 Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 6-8. 
19 Pekař, České katastry, pp. 4-5, 9, Berní Rula 1, pp. 38-40. 
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drawing up the Berní Rula in particular places.20 Fourth, as discussed below, the Berní Rula 
yields estimates of the minimum size of the non-agricultural sector which are consistent with 
available data from other studies. Finally, as we find in the econometric analyses presented 
below, rural non-agricultural activity in the Berní Rula varied substantially and systematically 
across villages, in ways that were significantly related to other socioeconomic characteristics.  
What emerges, then, when we investigate rural occupational structure in mid-
seventeenth-century Bohemia? Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 6,983 occupied 
villages in our data set. The proportion of householders in Bohemian villages engaging in 
non-agricultural activities in 1654 varied between zero and 100 per cent of all household 
heads, with an average of 6.7 per cent. These findings decisively refute the traditional 
assumptions discussed above, according to which serfdom precluded rural non-agricultural 
activity except as coerced labour for overlords.21 Rather, 1 in 15 Bohemian rural households 
was engaged in non-agricultural activity sufficiently prominent to be recorded in a register 
primarily focussed on agricultural landholding.  
Table 2 sets these findings in a comparative context, while recognizing that compiling 
early modern occupational data is still a work in progress.22 A first step was to use our 
findings on rural occupational structure to calculate estimates of overall occupational 
structure. Our data set covers c. 70 per cent of Bohemia but excludes the capital Prague and 
other urban centres. Combining its figures on rural non-agricultural activity with plausible 
                                                            
20 Throughout this paper, ‘significant’ means the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level. 
21 Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm, Industrialization, pp. 17-20, 216-20. 
22 De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 527; Shaw-Taylor, ‘Occupational structure’; Shaw-
Taylor, Wrigley, Kitson, Davies, Newton, and Satchell, ‘Occupational structure’; Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley, 
‘Occupational structure’; Cerman, ‘Labour-intensive proto-industrialization’, pp. 1-5; Klein and Ogilvie, 
‘Occupational structure’, pp. 8-10. 
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assumptions about occupational structure of missing regions and urban centres yields an 
estimated overall proportion of non-agricultural occupations which lies in the range between 
18.2 per cent (excluding Prague and assuming towns were 55 per cent non-agricultural) and 
31.3 per cent (including Prague and assuming towns were 100 per cent non-agricultural).  
The average for our 6,983-village sample in 1654, as Table 2 shows, is similar in 
magnitude to averages reported in Bohemian regional studies using other sources, including 
manorial lists of industrial and commercial dues.23 It is also consistent with Cerman’s finding 
that even regions of Bohemia (such as the north) which ultimately became densely industrial 
in the later eighteenth century initially expanded mainly through agricultural intensification 
and agricultural wage-labour rather than proto-industrialization.24 Even northern Bohemia’s 
rural industries intensified only gradually in the course of the seventeenth century, and 
Cerman finds no evidence that textile proto-industries stimulated a penumbra of provisioning 
industries by other rural inhabitants, as occurred in England.25 Even serf brewers and 
distillers were scarce in rural Bohemia, since provision of beer and spirits was monopolized 
by demesne breweries and village headman with manorial privileges.26 Long after 1700, 
Bohemian proto-industrial settlements were characterized by multiple, part-time, irregular 
by-employments rather than specialization in non-agricultural occupations.27 Zeitlhofer 
reports similar findings for southern Bohemia: low proportions of non-agricultural 
                                                            
23 Cerman and Štefanová, ‘Wirtschaft’, pp. 80-2; Matušíková and Pazderová, ‘Regionen’, p. 144. 
24 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 266, 270, 274-6, 286, 324. 
25 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 291-2. 
26 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, p. 102; Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, p. 449; Ogilvie, ‘Village community’, 
pp. 406, 421-4. 
27 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 297-301; Cerman, ‘Labour-intensive proto-industrialization’, pp. 11-
20; Melton, ‘Population structure’, pp. 324-5. 
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occupations even among land-poor and landless groups, who instead depended mainly on 
agricultural wage-labour.28 
The proportion of non-agricultural occupations in Bohemia in 1654, as Table 2 shows, 
was similar to that in Poland in 1580, southern Italy around 1750, or Finland in the 1750s and 
1760s.29 These eastern-central, southern, and nordic European regions were, as late as the 
eighteenth century, characterized by 6-14 per cent non-agricultural occupations in rural areas 
and 10-30 per cent overall. This contrasts starkly with England and the Netherlands, which 
from an early date had 20-40 per cent non-agricultural occupations in rural areas (even non-
proto-industrial ones), and 30-60 per cent overall. Non-agricultural specialization was thus 
distinctly lower in mid-seventeenth-century Bohemia than in the precocious north Atlantic 
economies, but comparable to other societies in eastern-central, southern, and nordic Europe.  
As Table 1 reveals, moreover, there was substantial variation across Bohemian 
villages: in some, all householders practised non-agricultural occupations, while in others, 
no-one did so. What gave rise to such wide variation across the same rural economy at the 
same period? Exploring this question may help understand why occupational structure varied 
so greatly across different parts of Europe during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’.  
To this end, we undertook a multivariate regression analysis of the relationship 
between the density of non-agricultural occupations and other village characteristics in mid-
seventeenth-century Bohemia. We estimated the following general regression equation: 
                                                            
28 Zeitlhofer, Besitzwechsel, esp. 91-100. 
29 The similar figures for Bohemia and Poland cast further doubt on the assumption that Bohemia was an outlier 
among second-serfdom economies. 
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NonagricEmplij = α + β1(Village Size)ij + β2(Arable Sector)ij + β3(Pastoral Sector)ij + 
β4(Social Composition)ij + β5(Other Village Characteristics)ij + β6(Second Serfdom 
Proxy)ij + δj + εij         (1) 
The dependent variable, NonagricEmplij, is defined as the share of holders engaged in non-
agricultural activities in village i located on an estate j; α is a constant term; δj is an estate j 
fixed effect; and εij is an error term. The β- coefficients represent the vectors of estimated 
coefficients, since each set of explanatory variables contains several regressors. The 
definitions of the individual regressors, and the theoretical motivations for including them, 
are discussed below in the context of the findings for each set of explanatory variables. 
The econometric analysis raised a number of issues, including potential 
multicollinearity of independent variables, left-censoring of the dependent variable, estate-
specific fixed effects, and outliers.30 To establish the extent of multicollinearity, we 
calculated correlations among the explanatory variables and variation inflation factors for 
each explanatory variable. The correlations were small and the variation inflation factors less 
than 2, indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue.31 To accommodate left-censoring of 
our dependent variable, we use a Tobit estimator. To check the sensitivity of our results to the 
parametric assumption which Tobit makes about the distribution of the error term εij, we 
relaxed the assumption using Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood.32 All regressions were 
                                                            
30 Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 17-20. 
31 Unsurprisingly, the exception was correlation among different measures of social stratification, as discussed 
below.  
32 Santos Silva and Tenreyro, ‘Log’; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, ‘Further simulation evidence’; Klein and 
Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, p. 18. PPML does not require the dependent variable to be an integer; see 
Gouriéroux, Montfort, and Trognon, ‘Theory’; Gouriéroux, Montfort, and Trognon, ‘Applications’; Cameron 
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robust to using this alternative estimator. To control for unobserved effects of the estate or 
overlord on villages, we used estate-specific dummies δj, and to allow for arbitrary 
correlation and heteroskedasticity of errors within estates we used cluster-robust standard 
errors at the estate level.33 Since the Tobit estimator is highly sensitive to extreme 
observations, we tested for outliers, conservatively excluding 147 villages which combined 
extremely high proportions of deserted holdings with extremely high female headship.34 
Having described our econometric approach, we are now in a position to discuss the 
multivariate findings and their implications for early modern occupational structure and the 
second serfdom.  
III 
How was occupational structure affected by urbanization and agglomeration 
economies? Changes in occupational structure in early modern Europe are widely regarded as 
resulting partly from increases in settlement size: a growth in the size of villages, creating 
larger local pools of demand for crafts and services; and an expansion of towns, creating 
positive externalities for rural hinterlands.35 These hypotheses motivated us to include as 
regressors the number of holdings (i.e., households) in the village, the share of empty 
holdings in the village, and the share of the estate’s population living in towns. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
and Trivedi, Regression analysis. We therefore estimated PPML with the dependent variable as the share and 
(separately) the number of non-agricultural occupations. 
33 Wooldridge, Econometric analysis, p. 867; Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 18-19. 
34 Klein and Ogilvie, ‘Occupational structure’, pp. 19-20. 
35 De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, pp. 520ff; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, ‘Retail 
development’, pp. 78-82. 
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In theory, both larger rural settlements and larger urban centres could have created 
economies of agglomeration attracting rural people into non-agricultural activities through 
information flow, specialization, division of labour, and larger pools of suppliers and 
customers. A first positive effect would operate via the size of the village itself, with larger 
village size encouraging non-agricultural occupations, both by reducing production costs and 
by increasing demand. A second positive effect would operate via town size, whereby rural 
non-agricultural activities might be encouraged by urban demand for rural goods and 
services. Towns might also transmit urban consumption aspirations to country-dwellers, 
creating demand for village shops or crafts, as postulated by theories of an early modern 
Consumer and Industrious Revolution. A third effect of towns would be negative, however: 
urban crafts and services might substitute for rural non-agricultural activities, via superior 
production efficiency or institutional suppression of rural competition. The effects of 
agglomeration economies on rural non-agricultural occupations were therefore likely to differ 
depending on whether the agglomeration was located within the village or in towns, and on 
whether towns complemented or substituted for village activities.  
Bohemia provides a good laboratory for exploring agglomeration economies beyond 
northwest Europe. First, it had many fewer towns than the north Atlantic societies for which 
hypotheses about early modern agglomeration economies were originally formulated. 
Second, its towns and villages were smaller, depopulated by warfare (1618-48) and re-
Catholicization (1651-4).36 Third, its towns enjoyed institutional privileges entitling 
                                                            
36 Fügedi, ‘Demographic landscape’, pp. 55-7; Cerman, ‘Bohemia’, pp. 149-52; Melton, ‘Population structure’, 
pp. 318-20. 
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craftsmen and merchants to suppress rural competition to a degree no longer possible in the 
Low Countries or England.37  
Our analysis finds that village agglomerations in seventeenth-century Bohemia 
exercised the predicted positive effect on occupational structure. In Table 3, non-agricultural 
activity in a village was positively associated with its number of households. The positive 
association is statistically significant, both in Regression (1) where the share of deserted 
holdings is not taken into account and in Regressions (2)-(7) where this variable is included 
to control for the effects of war and religious emigration. The magnitude of village 
agglomeration economies was not trivial, since the elasticity of non-agricultural activity with 
respect to village size, evaluated at sample mean values, was 0.52. That is, a 1 per cent 
increase in village size was associated with a 0.52 per cent increase in the fraction of village 
householders engaging in non-agricultural activities. 
The positive association between village size and non-agricultural activity in Bohemia 
is consistent with findings for the Netherlands, Flanders, England, and Germany, where 
larger settlements had significantly higher densities of one specific non-agricultural activity, 
retailing.38 Local agglomeration economies inside villages prevailed not just in western 
Europe, therefore, but also in eastern-central Europe under the second serfdom. This provides 
further evidence of the non-autarkic character of the serf economy, and suggests that 
Bohemia’s non-agricultural sector was likely to have expanded alongside its demographic 
recovery after 1654, an important hypothesis for exploration in future research.  
Urban agglomerations, by contrast, were negatively related to rural non-agricultural 
activity in early modern Bohemia. Manorial migration barriers and purchasing prerogatives 
                                                            
37 Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, pp. 449-50; Ogilvie, Institutions, pp. 31-3. 
38 Ogilvie, ‘Consumption’, pp. 301-4; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, ‘Retail development’, pp. 78-9. 
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inhibited serf transactions outside the estate, so urban influences are best measured by 
urbanization on the estate itself.39 In all specifications in Table 3, this variable was negatively 
related to non-agricultural activity in the estate’s villages. This contrasts with the situation in 
the developed western provinces of the Netherlands, for instance, where high retail density in 
towns was associated with high retail density in villages. Only in less developed eastern 
Dutch provinces, where towns enjoyed greater institutional advantages, was there a wide 
rural-urban gap, suggesting that urban traders crowded out rural ones.40 Bohemia was more 
similar to these eastern Dutch provinces: the presence of urban centres did not favour rural 
non-agricultural activity but stifled it.  
Craftsmen and merchants in Bohemian towns observably used their urban privileges 
to stifle rural competition.41 In a single court sitting in 1662, for instance, the Frýdlant town 
butchers got the local seigneur to punish a villager for violating their guild privileges by 
trading in cattle, and the tailors brought down seigneurial penalties on serfs from three other 
villages for buying cheap garments from rural interlopers.42 In 1686, the Frýdlant potters 
secured heavy seigneurial penalties against a poor villager who had built a rural kiln ‘counter 
to guild privileges’.43 As late as the mid-eighteenth century, villages around Cheb were 
forbidden to admit new inhabitants practising non-agricultural occupations, existing village 
weavers were forbidden to operate additional looms, and villagers were ordered to patronize 
                                                            
39 Krofta, Dějiny, pp. 196-8, Petráň, Poddaný lid, pp. 188-9; Ogilvie, ‘Communities’, 81, 92-8; Klein, 
‘Institutions’, 67-8; Ogilvie, ‘Choices’, 280-3. 
40 Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, ‘Retail development’, pp. 78-9. 
41 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 283-4, 300; Zeitlhofer, ‘Besitztransfer’, pp. 67-8, 78, 84; Ogilvie, 
‘Economic world’, pp. 449-50. 
42 Státní Oblastní Archiv Litomĕřice, Pobočka Dĕčín, Fond Rodinný Archiv Clam-Gallasů, Historická Sbírka, 
Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fols. 57-59 (1 Aug. 1662). 
43 Ibid., 2. část, dodatky (Frýdlant) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fol. 31r, 24 Apr. 1686. 
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town craftsmen.44 Such prohibitions and penalties could not wholly stifle rural crafts and 
commerce, but certainly increased their costs and risks, reducing the economic viability of 
marginal village operations.45  
This arose from the fact that in Bohemia, as in many parts of central and eastern 
Europe, towns were not enclaves of institutional freedom. ‘Free’ towns such as Cheb may 
have been insulated from the powers of great seigneurs under the second serfdom, but they 
used their political dominion over the surrounding villages to enforce the economic privileges 
of their guilded burghers. ‘Subject’ towns such as Frýdlant were subordinated to the 
jurisdiction and fiscal exactions of the seigneur who owned the surrounding villages. Their 
guilded burghers put pressure on the seigneur to enforce their privileges against competitive 
pressures, even when these emanated from his own villagers, and gave him fiscal incentives 
to do so. Across Bohemia as a whole, such urban pressures against rural competition appear 
to have operated strongly enough to counteract the potentially stimulative effect of urban 
agglomeration economies.  
The findings for Bohemia, as for the eastern Netherlands, show that certain types of 
urban centre could actually hinder rural development. In a wider perspective, this suggests 
caution in using urbanization as a metric for pre-modern economic growth where other 
evidence is lacking. 
IV 
Analyzing non-agricultural activities requires controlling for characteristics of 
agriculture, the largest sector of the economy. Agriculture affects non-agricultural activity 
directly through costs of industrial raw materials (e.g. flax, timber) and trade wares (e.g. 
                                                            
44 Chalupa et al., Tereziánky Katastr, Svazek 1, Rustikál (Kraje A-Ch), p. 283. 
45 Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, pp. 449-50; Ogilvie, ‘Staat’, pp. 60-3. 
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grain, cattle), and indirectly through opportunity costs of using labour, land and capital in 
crafts or commerce instead of farming.46 In theory, richer agricultural resource endowments 
could create countervailing effects on non-agricultural activities: a positive, complementary 
effect via reducing local costs of agricultural products for further industrial processing, 
trading, and transporting; and a negative, substitution effect via increasing the opportunity 
costs of allocating inputs to non-agricultural activities.  
To explore these multiple influences, we included as regressors various measures of 
each village’s agricultural activity: the total arable land per occupied holding (in all 
specifications); the share of holders with less than 15 strych (4.3 hectares or 10.7 acres) of 
arable, the minimum needed to support an average central European family of c. 5 persons 
(specifications 5-7);47 the share of ‘peasants’, householders with enough arable for 
subsistence (specification 3); the share of ‘smallholders’ with little arable and of ‘cottagers’ 
with no arable (specifications 1-2, 4-7); and the number of working and non-working animals 
per holder (all specifications). 
As Table 3 shows, the coefficients on all measures of arable endowments were 
significant and negative, suggesting that opportunity costs played an important role in serf 
occupational choices. Inhabitants of villages with more arable land per farm, lower 
proportions of householders with little or no arable, and more working animals faced higher 
opportunity costs of engaging in non-agricultural activity and did so less. Surprisingly, 
however, these ‘arable’ variables all simultaneously show a significant relationship with non-
agricultural occupations, showing that they exercised independent effects. Smallholders and 
cottagers with little or no arable land needed to find other livelihoods, but in villages where 
                                                            
46 See Ogilvie, ‘Proto-industrialization’, pp. 162-6. 
47 Achilles, Deutsche Agrargeschichte, pp. 23-4, 26. 
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average endowments of arable land and draft animals were low, all holders apparently faced 
lower opportunity costs of allocating resources outside agriculture.  
Pastoral agriculture, by contrast, was positively associated with non-agricultural 
activities, as shown by the significant positive coefficient on the number of non-working 
cattle in all specifications in Table 3. Cattle were valuable inputs in diversifying into crafts 
such as butchering, tanning, and cheese-making, and into trading in animals, meat, leather, 
and dairy products.48 These complementarities evidently outweighed any tendency for 
pastoral production and non-agricultural occupations to increase each other’s opportunity 
costs in terms of labour, land or capital deployment.  
In a wider perspective, the significant and pervasive relationship between arable 
agriculture and rural non-agricultural activity is consistent with Bohemian serfs’ taking 
account of opportunity costs in allocating resources to different occupations. This decisively 
refutes the still influential Chayanovian idea that serfs were unwilling or unable to ascribe 
quantitative values to time, land, capital, or animal energy.49 The fact that the relationship 
between non-agricultural activity and the other explanatory variables holds even controlling 
for agricultural characteristics demonstrates that non-agricultural work was not merely 
something serfs fell back on when farm-work was unavailable, but rather a positive choice 
taken in response to other aspects of their constraint structure. We now turn to these other 
factors. 
V 
                                                            
48 Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, p. 444. 
49 Chayanov et al., Theory; Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm, Industrialization, pp. 16, 40-4, 51, 58, 79, 214-5, 
236, 239, 274, 286, 330. For criticisms, see Ogilvie, ‘Economic world’, pp. 430-5; Dennison, Institutional 
framework, pp. 1-28; Cerman, Villagers, pp. 109-11; Ogilvie, ‘Choices’, pp. 269-78 
  18
The first factor is social stratification. A central institutional feature of many early 
modern European economies was that each person formally belonged to a given social 
stratum. In Bohemia, as in many other parts of central and eastern Europe, social stratum was 
not defined economically (in terms of occupation or wealth) or socio-culturally (in terms of 
education, speech, or consumption habits), but institutionally and legally. At the top of the 
village hierarchy were the ‘peasants’ (Czech sedlák or rolník, German Bauer), who owned 
enough arable land for agricultural subsistence, paid the highest manorial dues and state 
taxes, and owed the most forced labour to the overlord, often with draft animals as well as 
human workers. Then came the smallholders (Czech zahradník, German Gärtner), who had 
some arable land but not enough to subsist from, paid lower dues and taxes, and owed 
services to the landlord with human labour only. Finally, the cottagers (Czech chalupník, 
German Häusler) held only their own cottages and gardens, paid minor dues and taxes, and 
owed lighter (though increasing) labour services.50 All other Bohemian serfs lived in 
households headed by members of these three official strata, as family members, servants, or 
inmate-lodgers (Czech podruh, German Hausleute or Hausgenoßen).51 A few outsiders, 
notably freemen (Czech svobodník, German Freibauer) and Jews (Czech žid, German Jude), 
also dwelt in Bohemian villages under manorial ‘privileges’. 
A Bohemian serf belonged to a particular social stratum because of the manorial 
status of his landholding. He could only move into a different stratum by moving to an 
existing landholding that appertained to that stratum. Bohemian landholdings were legally 
                                                            
50 Ogilvie and Cerman, ‘Bohemian census’, pp. 335, 345; Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 189-258; 
Ogilvie and Edwards 2000, p. 176; Zeitlhofer, Besitztransfer, pp. 86-109. 
51 Our Berni Rula data record only 11 independent rural inmate-lodgers and provide no information on 
economic activities of dependent ones inside others’ households. For a detailed examination of Bohemian 
inmate-lodgers, see Ogilvie and Cerman, ‘Bohemian census’. 
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impartible, and new ones could only be created with manorial and communal agreement. The 
relative size of the three core social strata in a Bohemian village was thus exogenous to its 
occupational structure. The social structure of the village was the outcome of the initial 
allocation of landholdings of different strata in that village’s original settlement charter in the 
Middle Ages, the number of generations during which non-inheriting offspring or immigrants 
sought to establish smallholdings or cottages on marginal or common land, and the varying 
incentives of different overlords and communes to tolerate the formation of such holdings.52 
The relative size of the different strata in a Bohemian village in 1654 was thus not a short-
term, individual choice variable but rather historically and institutionally determined and 
hence exogenous to the village’s current occupational structure.  
Given the importance of these institutionally defined social strata in the Bohemian 
economy, all our regressions included variables registering their proportions among village 
holdings. In Table 3, specifications 1-2 control for the proportions of smallholders and 
cottagers only, specification 3 focuses on the proportion of peasants, and specifications 4-7 
also include the proportions of freemen and Jews.  
Traditional historiography argued that ‘sub-peasant’ strata (smallholders and 
cottagers) were compelled into non-agricultural activities by lack of land. Cerman, by 
contrast, found that it was initially the peasant stratum that dominated Bohemian rural 
industries; sub-peasants only entered later, and then often in irregular by-employments 
alongside agricultural labour and other wage-work. Non-agricultural activity could thus be 
undertaken by any Bohemian social stratum.53 
                                                            
52 Ogilvie and Cerman, ‘Bohemian census’; Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 316-22; Zeitlhofer, 
‘Besitztransfer’, pp. 86-109; Zeitlhofer, Besitzwechsel, pp. 71-85. 
53 Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’, pp. 294-7. 
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For 1654, however, our multivariate analysis finds that non-agricultural activity was 
indeed significantly greater in villages with larger sub-peasant strata. Density of non-
agricultural occupations was positively related to the proportions of smallholders and 
cottagers (Table 3, specifications 1-2, 4-7) and negatively to the proportion of peasants 
(specification 3).54 Strikingly, the positive relationship between non-agricultural activity and 
the proportion of smallholders and cottagers remains significant even controlling for the share 
of village holdings with fewer than 15 strych of arable land, the minimum necessary for 
agricultural self-sufficiency (specification 5).55 This suggests that the positive link between 
non-agricultural activity and sub-peasants was caused not merely by their lack of land but 
also by other aspects of their status. One possibility is that their lower burden of manorial 
labour services freed their household labour for alternative work. This hypothesis opens 
perspectives for future research into precisely how manorial demands affected labour 
allocation by different rural strata. 
‘Outsider’ groups such as freemen and Jews were also positively associated with rural 
non-agricultural activity (Table 3, specifications 4-7). Freemen could practise any 
occupation, and landlords often permitted them residence precisely because they had 
industrial skills unavailable locally, although almost all freemen in our Berní Rula data also 
held arable land. Jews were forbidden to practise many occupations, including agriculture, so 
they had to engage in non-agricultural activities.56 Thus the least advantaged groups in 
Bohemian rural society – land-poor smallholders, landless cottagers, and outsiders such as 
                                                            
54 The ‘peasant’ variable and the ‘smallholder’/‘cottager’ variables were multicollinear, so could only be 
included in separate regressions.  
55 Achilles, Deutsche Agrargeschichte, pp. 23-4, 26.  
56 The low share of Jews explains the volatility of the coefficients in Table 3, specifications 5-7. 
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Jews and freemen – were central to the growth of non-agricultural occupations under the 
second serfdom. 
VI 
What role was played by large-scale industrial infrastructure? Early modern Bohemia 
certainly possessed such infrastructure, as shown by the fact that the Berní Rula recorded 
mills, ironworks, and breweries. In theory, industrial infrastructure might either encourage 
serfs’ non-agricultural activity through complementarities or stifle it by competing for inputs. 
Our regressions found no significant relationship with ironworks or breweries, suggesting 
that such manufactories, often owned by landlords, operated orthogonally to small-scale serf 
enterprises.57  
The presence of a mill in the village, by contrast, was associated with significantly 
higher non-agricultural activity in all specifications in Table 3. Since the location of water-
driven mills was exogenously determined by hydrological factors, we know the causal effect 
ran from the mill to other non-agricultural enterprises and not vice versa. Mills had an 
advantage over ‘organic’ energy from human and animal labour because they supplied energy 
more intensely and continuously. Although the Berní Rula did not usually record the specific 
purpose for which a mill was used, in pre-modern Europe watermills increased the 
productivity of a wide array of energy-intensive activities including grinding grain into flour 
for baking, cracking husks of malted barley and wheat for brewing, cutting logs into planks, 
fulling woollen cloths, tanning leather, crushing ores, running blast furnaces, driving forge 
hammers, slitting iron bars into rods, sharpening tools, pressing oil from hemp and other 
seeds, pulping rags for paper, and driving bellows for smithies. Such processing activities in 
                                                            
57 Results available from the authors on request. 
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turn attracted ancillary non-agricultural activities, especially in transport and commerce, 
which benefited from proximity to mills as processing centres.  
The regression results in Table 3 suggest that such complementarities between mills 
and other non-agricultural activities were substantial in rural Bohemia. The only factor that 
interfered with the positive relationship between milling and other non-agricultural activities 
was landlord presence on village holdings. As shown by the negative coefficient on the 
interaction term in Table 5, the otherwise positive synergies between milling and rural non-
agricultural enterprises turned decisively negative in villages with some direct landlord 
presence. This striking reversal, discussed below, sheds light on the complex impact of the 
second serfdom on the Bohemian rural economy. 
VII 
How did occupational structure interact with the position of women? Gender roles in 
historical societies are sometimes assumed to be culturally or biologically determined, but 
recent historiography suggests that women’s position both influenced the economy and was 
influenced by it.58 Our regression models therefore included the share of independent 
households headed by females, an indicator of women’s position that has been successfully 
used to analyze other early modern European economies.59 Across our entire sample of 6,983 
Bohemian villages in 1654, the average female headship rate was just over 3 per cent. This is 
considerably lower than the 10-15 per cent normally found in early modern western European 
villages, but lies in the range reported in other studies of eastern-central European rural 
                                                            
58 Ogilvie, Bitter living, pp. 320-54. 
59 Ogilvie and Edwards, ‘Women’, pp. 965-82; Ogilvie, Bitter living, pp. 217-24; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, 
‘Retail development’, pp. 77-8; Todd, ‘Demographic determinism’. 
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societies, including Bohemia.60 However, Bohemian female headship was not invariant: some 
villages had 30 per cent female householders while others had none.  
In all regression specifications in Table 3, higher female household headship was 
associated with a significantly higher share of householders practising non-agricultural 
occupations. In this, Bohemia resembled western European economies such as the 
Netherlands, where non-agricultural activities such as retailing were denser in villages with 
higher female headship.61 Indeed, the findings for Bohemia strengthen the hypothesis that 
female headship was positively associated with non-agricultural activities by confirming that 
this prevailed even controlling for settlement size, agricultural structure, social composition, 
and other village characteristics, and in eastern-central Europe under the second serfdom as 
well as in the economically precocious North Sea region.62  
A two-way causal relationship almost certainly underlay this positive link. Female 
headship could encourage non-agricultural activity in several ways. Physical differences 
made women more productive in activities such as crafts and commerce, requiring endurance, 
dexterity, communication or calculation skills, while men were more productive in 
occupations such as arable agriculture and labouring which required greater upper-body 
strength. Women with offspring were also relatively productive in activities such as crafts 
and commerce that could be carried out in domestic locations and combined more easily with 
household production. So if female headship was high in a village for exogenous reasons 
(e.g. wartime devastation, male emigration, institutional tolerance) this could increase local 
density of non-agricultural activities. But causation could also run in the opposite direction. If 
intensity of non-agricultural occupations was high in a village for exogenous reasons – the 
                                                            
60 Ogilvie and Edwards, ‘Women’, esp. p. 971 (Table 2). 
61 Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, ‘Retail development’, pp. 77-8. 
62 Ogilvie and Edwards, ‘Women’, pp. 980-9. 
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ones this paper seeks to identify – that could enable more women to support independent 
households there. Furthermore, underlying factors could facilitate both female headship and 
non-agricultural activity. Less severe communal or manorial enforcement, for instance, could 
lower barriers to women seeking to support themselves independently in all occupations (not 
just non-agricultural ones) and to all economic agents (not just women) in seeking to practise 
non-agricultural occupations.63 
For mid-seventeenth-century Bohemia we could not address the econometric 
problems created by these two-way causal links using instrumental variables, since the 
documentary sources supply no variable correlated with female headship but not with the 
intensity of non-agricultural occupations. Furthermore, the determinants of pre-industrial 
female headship itself are still not fully understood. Our alternative econometric approach 
was to estimate our regressions with and without the female headship variable, interact 
female headship with other variables, and test for robustness. Including female headship 
hardly altered the estimated coefficients on other variables and the link between female 
headship and occupational structure was statistically significant in all specifications. This 
provides comprehensive support for the conclusion that there was a significant and pervasive 
association between women’s autonomy and non-agricultural activity, even controlling for 
other factors. However, the potential for two-way causal effects remains, opening up 
perspectives for deeper analyses to investigate micro-level determinants of gender-specific 
work patterns under the second serfdom.  
The only exception to the positive association between female headship and rural non-
agricultural activity in rural Bohemia emerged when we introduced interactions between 
female headship and measures of landlord presence in the village, as shown by the negative 
                                                            
63 Ogilvie and Edwards, ‘Women’, pp. 982-9; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie, ‘Retail development’, p. 78. 
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coefficient on the interaction term in Table 5. This indicates the importance of exploring the 
economic role of Bohemian landlords under the second serfdom, to which we now turn. 
VIII 
In early modern Bohemia, serfs participated actively in factor and product markets, 
but within comprehensive institutional constraints imposed by landlords.64 The rich 
historiography on the European second serfdom is deeply divided concerning its economic 
impact. On the one hand, traditional ‘manorial dominance’ views assume that under serfdom 
landlords stifled serfs’ non-agricultural activities altogether.65 On the other, revisionist, 
‘communal autonomy’ approaches hold that landlords were unable to intervene inside 
villages and hence hardly affected serfs’ economic activities. Some revisionist approaches go 
so far as to claim that western European ‘free’ economies were no more advanced than east-
Elbian ‘serf’ economies, including in their occupational structure: demesne lordship, it is 
argued, positively encouraged serf crafts and commerce.66 A more recent, ‘institutional’ 
approach argues that although the overarching institutional framework of serfdom tended to 
distort resource allocation and stifle growth, certain components of this framework enabled 
landlords to extract rents from specific non-agricultural activities, which they therefore had 
incentives to encourage.67 
                                                            
64 Maur, Český komorní velkostatek; Cerman, ‘Proto-industrialisierung’; Cerman, Villagers; Ogilvie, 
‘Economic world’; Ogilvie, ‘Communities’; Ogilvie, ‘Staat’; Ogilvie, ‘Village community’; Klein, 
‘Institutions’. 
65 E.g. Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm, Industrialization, pp. 17-20, , 216-20. 
66 Cerman, Villagers, pp.109-11, 118, 123.  
67 Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom’; Klein, ‘Institutions’; Dennison, ‘Institutional framework of serfdom’; Briggs, ‘English 
serfdom’. 
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This continuing debate motivated our search for a way to measure the intensity of the 
second serfdom quantitatively. The only measures available for our sample of 6,983 villages 
in 1654 related to the presence of village holdings currently used or occupied by the landlord. 
We postulated that manorial presence on village holdings might capture the intensity of 
landlords’ interest, information, and control over villagers’ economic choices. To interpret 
this proxy for manorial control, however, we must recognize the complexities it raises. 
The first complexity arises from the difficulty of measuring institutional constraints 
quantitatively. Bohemian landlords had wide and variegated entitlements to intervene in 
villagers’ lives. A variable capturing manorial presence on village holdings is better than 
having no quantitative measure of the ‘second serfdom’ at all, but does not register how 
manorial presence was being exercised. The Berní Rula does, however, provide some 
indications of what it implied. For one thing, such holdings tended to bring manorial 
personnel to the village, as when the Berní Rula recorded that ‘the nobility’s bureaucrat is 
living in a dwelling owned by the landlord’.68 Local presence of manorial personnel 
inevitably created the potential for enhanced manorial monitoring and control over serfs’ 
activities. In other cases, the Berní Rula recorded that ‘the nobility is sowing the fields’, 
indicating potential enhanced demand for agricultural labour.69 A third major type of 
manorial presence was when ‘the nobility has built a tavern in the village’.70 This was likely 
to signal enhanced manorial surveillance over those non-agricultural activities legally 
                                                            
68 See Berní Rula 11, p. 516 (Kraj čáslavský II); Berní Rula 28, p. 849 (Kraj prácheňský II. díl); Berní Rula 31, 
p. 109 (Kraj vltavský). 
69 See Berní Rula 8-9, pp. 24, 344 (Kraj boleslavský); Berní Rula 11, p. 613 (Kraj čáslavský II); Berní Rula 12, 
p. 226 (Kraj hradecký 1. díl); Berní Rula 26, p. 239 (Kraj podbrdský); Berní Rula 32, p. 247 (Kraj žatecký 1. 
díl). 
70 See Berní Rula 18, pp. 344, 449 (Kraj kouřimský díl 1); Berní Rula 25, p. 893 (Kraj plzeňský díl 3). 
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monopolized by privileged village taverns, including hop-cultivation, brewing, distilling, 
baking, and butchering.71 Qualitative and institutional evidence can thus illuminate the 
econometric findings. 
A second complexity arises from the fact that although manorial presence on village 
holdings registered a potential intensification of landlord intervention, it measured this at the 
‘intensive margin’ (stronger versus weaker enforcement of an existing institutional system) 
rather than the ‘extensive margin’ (presence or absence of the institutional system altogether). 
This variable does not distinguish Bohemian villages with the second serfdom from those 
without, but rather enables comparisons across villages which were all subject to the second 
serfdom, though possibly to differing degrees. It therefore captures those effects of the 
second serfdom that depended on direct local enforcement, not those generated by wider 
institutional constraints implemented beyond the individual village via manorial courts, 
manorial administrators, demesne foremen, collaboration among different landlords (e.g. 
reciprocal migration restrictions), or state enforcement (e.g. military force, jurisdictional 
inaccessibility).72 
A third complexity is the probable two-way causal relationship between manorial 
presence and occupational structure. On the one hand, manorial presence could affect serfs’ 
incentives to undertake non-agricultural activities. Conversely, however, existing non-
agricultural activities could affect landlords’ incentives, e.g. by attracting them to occupy 
village holdings in order to monitor extraction of rents from rural crafts. Surviving data 
sources provide no instrumental variable (one correlated with landlord presence but not with 
non-agricultural activity) that could solve this endogeneity problem. Our alternative approach 
                                                            
71 Ogilvie, ‘Village community’, pp. 421-5. 
72 Klein, ‘Institutions’; Ogilvie, ‘Staat’; Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom’. 
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was to estimate the regressions with and without landlord presence, to explore different 
measures of landlord presence, and to include interaction terms between landlord presence 
and other regressors. The results enable us to characterize the complex relationship between 
landlords and serfs’ occupational decisions more fully, while still leaving interesting open 
questions for future research.  
The traditional ‘manorial dominance’ view of serfdom, at least in its more extreme 
manifestations, is refuted by our findings. Mid-seventeenth-century Bohemia was no autarkic 
or purely agricultural economy in which landlords stifled all rural non-agricultural activity. 
On the contrary, as we have seen, the Berní Rula recorded non-agricultural activities covering 
the entire spectrum: locally-oriented crafts, export-oriented proto-industries, retail trades, and 
even merchant commerce. Rural non-agricultural activity was less prevalent in Bohemia than 
in western Europe but not stifled altogether, and varied significantly with village 
characteristics. 
But the revisionist ‘communal autonomy’ view, according to which landlords were 
uninvolved with economic life inside serf villages, is also refuted by our findings, which 
reveal a significant and robust association between non-agricultural activity and landlord 
presence. Table 3 column 1, the simplest specification, already showed that the presence of at 
least one holding in the village occupied or used by the landlord was associated with a 
significantly higher intensity of non-agricultural activity in the village. This result became 
more striking in the specification in column 2, which controlled for the share of empty 
holdings in the village on the grounds that the use of a holding by a landlord might also be 
picking up the effect of desertions. It was also fully robust to alternative specifications of 
village social structure, as shown in columns 3-5. Changing how landlord presence was 
measured (specifications 6 and 7) left the significance of the association unchanged: the 
presence of landlord-occupied holdings, the share of arable land occupied by the landlord, 
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and the number of holdings he occupied were all significantly related to the density of non-
agricultural activities.73 
Superficially, this might seem to support a second variant of the revisionist view, 
according to which serfdom presented no obstacle to economic dynamism because landlords 
encouraged serf enterprises. However, deeper econometric analysis shows that the 
interrelationship between landlord presence and rural non-agricultural activity was not 
straightforwardly positive. Rather, as Tables 4 and 5 show, landlord presence also brought in 
its wake significant negative pressures on rural non-agricultural activity, both via 
nonlinearities and via interactions with other variables.  
We first investigate whether the association between non-agricultural activity and 
landlord presence was in fact a linear one. Table 4 presents the results of introducing into the 
regression specifications in Table 3 the square of the share of arable land occupied by the 
landlord and the square of the number of holdings thus occupied. It turns out that the 
association between non-agricultural activity and landlord presence was not linear at all, 
since the quadratic terms are negative and significant. The positive coefficient on landlord 
presence in Table 3 was merely a snapshot of the initial upward slope of a curvilinear 
relationship: a small landlord presence in the village was positively associated with non-
agricultural activity, but after a certain point this relationship flattened out. In concrete terms, 
on a single village holding, manorial presence might increase demand for non-agricultural 
goods or services from serfs, but when manorial presence spread to multiple holdings it 
began to crowd out serf crafts and commerce, possibly by siphoning off labour or by stifling 
enterprise through surveillance and rent extraction.  
                                                            
73 We estimated all specifications in Table 3 columns 1-5 using all alternative measures of landlord presence, 
but present only the specification in column 5. Results available from the authors on request. 
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Interaction terms reveal a second set of complexities. Table 5 presents the results of 
interacting landlord presence with, respectively, female household headship and the presence 
of mills. The original explanatory variables retain similar statistical significance and 
magnitudes to the ones they have in Table 3, landlord presence retains its positive coefficient, 
but the interaction terms are negative. On their own, both landlord presence and female 
headship were associated with greater non-agricultural activity, but when the landlord was 
present on village holdings, female headship was associated with less non-agricultural 
activity. Likewise, on their own, both landlord presence and village mills were positively 
associated with non-agricultural activity, but when the landlord was present on village 
holdings the association between milling and non-agricultural activity turned negative. 
Qualitative and institutional evidence can help explain these complex relationships 
between landlord presence, occupational structure, and other variables. Bohemian landlords 
engaged in a wide array of institutional interventions in the rural economy. At least four types 
of manorial intervention had the potential to affect serfs’ non-agricultural activities: operating 
manorial manufactories using serf labour; extorting license fees and dues from serfs’ non-
agricultural enterprises; granting milling monopolies; and controlling serfs’ access to 
landholdings. These four manorial strategies created multiple and often countervailing 
incentives for serfs to engage in non-agricultural activities. 
First, Bohemian landlords directly intervened in the non-agricultural sector by 
establishing demesne manufactories.74 These included ironworks, glassworks, fish-farms, 
breweries, and distilleries, often based on unpaid corvée labour and ‘forced wage labour’ 
                                                            
74 Janoušek, Historický vývoj, p. 12; Svoboda, ‘Feudální závislost’, p. 74; Kočí, ‘Robotní povinnosti’, p. 336; 
Maur, Český komorní velkostatek, p. 49; Maur, ‘Vývojové etapy’, pp. 207, 211; Maur, ‘Zemědělská výroba’, 
pp. 114, 120; Klíma, Manufakturní , pp. 131, 154; Myška, ‘Pre-industrial iron-making’, pp. 55-8. 
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extorted from serfs.75 Demesne enterprises did not directly feed into the non-agricultural 
occupations recorded in the Berní Rula, which solely reflect serfs’ own non-agricultural 
activities. But demesne enterprises affected serf occupations indirectly, via manorial labour 
demand. In attempting to increase their profits by diversifying into non-agricultural activities, 
Bohemian landlords faced labour scarcity caused by wartime depopulation and religious 
emigration. They tried to reduce costs by replacing hired labour with coerced labour extorted 
from villagers under the second serfdom.76 Demesne enterprises often mobilized both ‘Robot’ 
(compulsory labour dues) and ‘forced wage-labour’ (compulsory work at artificially low 
wages).77  
Demand for labour in demesne enterprises created incentives for landlords to establish 
a presence in villages that already had workers who were not fully employed in agriculture 
and might more easily be enticed or pressed to accept non-agricultural employment. Purely 
agricultural villages lacked local pools of workers with the desire, and possibly even the 
habits or skills, needed for non-agricultural work in demesne manufactories. Villages where 
local serfs were already active outside agriculture offered the possibility of recruiting non-
agricultural labourers more cheaply and with less resistance. This created a motive for 
landlords to establish a presence in villages where such activities were already more highly 
developed, in order to monitor and mobilize local non-agricultural labour pools.  
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A second type of manorial intervention which interacted with serfs’ non-agricultural 
activity was the practice of granting manorial licenses permitting serfs to engage in crafts and 
commerce in return for paying fees. Depopulation resulting from warfare and religious 
emigration shrank the pool of urban craftsmen.78 Landlords profited by granting permits to 
rural artisans in return for annual rents, fees, and dues.79 Rural bakers, butchers, and other 
craftsmen and traders were often obliged to pay fees in return for manorial licenses to 
practise these occupations. Private glassworks and ironworks had to obtain manorial 
permission to construct industrial buildings and workers’ houses, but then created demand for 
crafts and commercial operations servicing the manufactory and the surrounding industrial 
settlements, enabling the manor to levy additional dues.80  
The fact that Bohemian landlords could use their institutional powers to extract rents 
from serfs’ crafts and trades created manorial incentives to tolerate or encourage such non-
agricultural activities. Although urban guilds sometimes lobbied manorial administrations to 
restrict rural crafts, as we have seen, landlords had an incentive to ignore such lobbying if 
they could extort sufficient revenues from serf enterprises. The institutional characteristics of 
the Bohemian second serfdom were thus not inconsistent with a positive association between 
landlord presence and certain forms of non-agricultural activity by serfs.  
This does not, however, establish whether any such association was causal or in 
which direction causation ran. On the one hand, landlords had incentives to encourage rural 
non-agricultural activities because of the rents they could extract from those activities, either 
directly through demanding dues or indirectly through increasing effective demand for 
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demesne output such as beer and spirits. Having once encouraged such activities, landlords 
had an incentive to establish a presence in such villages to monitor and enforce the payment 
of craft dues. On the other hand, pre-existing non-agricultural activities in a village could 
attract manorial attention and create incentives for landlord presence in the village to ensure 
that any rents payable by rural tradesmen were properly delivered and that other activities 
that might threaten manorial interests were controlled. Such considerations make it likely that 
the positive association between at least a small degree of landlord presence and greater non-
agricultural activity in a village – the upward slope of the curvilinear relationship – resulted 
more from landlords being attracted to industrial or commercial villages than from industry 
and commerce being attracted to villages where landlords were present. But even if the 
dominant effect ran from non-agricultural activity to landlord presence, a subsidiary causal 
relationship may have operated in the opposite direction. 
Bohemian landlords also extracted rents from the rural economy in a third way: by 
limiting competition.81 One major sector in which they did so was milling. The landlord often 
legally bound villagers to a manorial mill and forbade them to use mills belonging to 
peasants, towns, or other landlords; the manorial mill charged monopoly prices and the 
profits went to the landlord.82 Another manorial tactic was to grant a monopoly to a private 
miller, who could therefore charge monopoly prices, but shared his profits with the manor by 
paying a license fee.83 Monopolistic mills did charge high prices, offer poor service, and 
profit the landlord, so millers and customers had incentives to avoid manorial dues on milling 
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and its spin-off activities, including baking, brewing, smithing, sawing wood, and processing 
textiles.84 
The nexus of incentives created by manorial milling prerogatives is consistent with 
the negative coefficient in Table 5 on the interaction term between mills and landlord 
presence. Manorial presence on village holdings facilitated manorial monitoring of the miller 
and any spin-off activities by serfs, burdening them with additional dues and stifling non-
agricultural activities that the presence of a mill in the village would otherwise have 
encouraged.  
Independently, mills were associated with more intense non-agricultural activity, as 
was a limited degree of landlord presence. But in villages where both coexisted, manorial 
presence reversed the positive effect of mills. These two different components of the second 
serfdom – the extraction of manorial rents from serfs’ non-agricultural occupations and the 
extraction of manorial rents from mills – exercised countervailing effects on the overall 
intensity of rural non-agricultural activity. 
A fourth way Bohemian landlords affected non-agricultural activity was through the 
unintended consequences of policies they pursued in spheres that were not directly related to 
serfs’ occupational choices. One example is the manorial regulation of access to 
landholdings, which discriminated strongly against females.85 As discussed above, female 
headship in early modern Bohemia was very low by western European standards. Analysis of 
a panel data set on Bohemian villages found a significant decline in the level of female 
headship and its elasticity with respect to socioeconomic influences over the period during 
which the Bohemian second serfdom intensified. Archival sources show manorial 
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administrators ejecting female farmers as poor fiscal risks and yielding to rent-seeking by 
village communities, communal oligarchs, and male relatives who sought to take over 
women’s holdings for their own ends. Manorial pressure was a major factor depressing 
female headship in Bohemia before Emancipation.86 
Female headship by itself, as discussed above, manifested a positively relationship 
with rural non-agricultural activity. But the interaction term with landlord presence was 
negative, as Table 5 shows. Independently, female headship was associated with greater non-
agricultural activity, as was a limited landlord presence locally. But in villages where both 
coexisted, the landlord’s presence reversed the positive relationship between female headship 
and non-agricultural activities, stifling a major source of non-agricultural initiative emanating 
from serfs themselves. Even where landlords were motivated to encourage non-agricultural 
occupations in order to extract rents from them, manorial policies to restrict female headship 
exercised a countervailing negative effect. The rents landlords could reap from female non-
agricultural activity were evidently outweighed by the perceived risks posed by female 
householders, who were regarded not just as unreliable payers of money rents and labour 
dues, but also as vexatious to the communal oligarchies on whom landlords depended to 
make the second serfdom work.87  
These negative interaction effects between landlord presence and other factors that 
normally favoured rural non-agricultural activity – mills, female heads – raise broader 
considerations. The second serfdom was a multi-faceted institutional system involving a 
conglomeration of various landlord tactics to extract rents from serfs.88 Where landlords 
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could extort fees and dues from serfs’ crafts and commerce, they understandably permitted or 
even encouraged such activities. This incentive was stronger in villages where at least a 
limited degree of manorial presence facilitated monitoring and control over the inhabitants. 
But landlords also engaged in other rent-extracting interventions, such as creating milling 
monopolies and restricting female headship, which choked off serfs’ non-agricultural 
activities. These interventions were also facilitated by manorial presence in villages, and help 
explain the negative interaction terms in Table 5. They may also explain why the relationship 
between non-agricultural activity and landlord presence was curvilinear: as manorial presence 
became more pervasive in a village, landlords’ encouragement of specific non-agricultural 
activities was increasingly outweighed by the stifling effect of broader manorial surveillance.  
The multiple effects of manorial rent-extraction may also help explain the low 
intensity of rural non-agricultural activity overall. As Table 2 showed, rural non-agricultural 
activity in early modern Bohemia, as in early modern Poland and Finland where landlords 
also enjoyed strong institutional powers, was substantially lower than in western Europe. 
Many Bohemian villages in 1654 had no inhabitants pursuing non-agricultural occupations, 
and the average proportion of rural non-agricultural activity was quite low. In Bohemia, as in 
other serf economies, landlords permitted or even encouraged non-agricultural activities 
under circumstances in which the manor was institutionally and logistically able to extract 
rents, including in villages where it had at least some local presence.89 But the wider panoply 
of manorial rent-extraction imposed heavy costs and risks on serf entrepreneurship, creating 
an institutional environment in which it was difficult for non-agricultural activity to expand 
beyond a certain level. Thus although local manorial oversight might motivate landlords to 
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permit or even encourage some rural non-agricultural activity, the overall framework of the 
second serfdom affected it negatively.90 
IX 
What are the wider implications of these findings? Changes in occupational structure, 
particularly the spread of rural non-agricultural activities, are viewed as key indicators of 
economic growth and potential contributory factors in the early modern ‘Little Divergence’. 
But hitherto we have lacked any systematic understanding of occupational structure in those 
many European economies where landlord powers over the rural economy intensified under 
the early modern second serfdom.  
Our quantitative evidence for some seven thousand Bohemian villages in 1654 
confirms previously impressionistic indications that eastern-central Europe had a lower 
intensity of rural non-agricultural activity than northwest Europe during the ‘Little 
Divergence’. On the other hand, early modern Bohemia was not wholly lacking in 
occupational diversification: its rural economy was characterized by a rich array of industrial 
and commercial activities and although many villages were purely agricultural, there were 
also some in which all households were active outside agriculture.  
Controlling for other local characteristics, rural non-agricultural activity in early 
modern Bohemia was significantly and positively associated with village size, pastoral 
agriculture, smallholder and cottager strata, Jews, freemen, female household heads, and 
mills. It was negatively related to arable agriculture, large peasant farms, and – strikingly – 
the presence of towns. These highly significant statistical relationships refute traditional 
assumptions that serf economies were characterized by a Chayanovian mentality or an 
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absence of market activity.91 Rather, Bohemian serfs eagerly participated in industrial and 
commercial markets and allocated resources according to their relative productivities in 
alternative activities.  
The negative association between rural non-agricultural activity and urban density in 
early modern Bohemia casts intriguing doubt on the hypothesis, derived from western 
Europe, that urban centres uniformly benefited economic growth. At least in this eastern-
central European economy, towns stifled rural crafts and commerce, possibly because of 
institutional privileges and political influence enabling town burghers and guilds to hinder 
rural competition. These findings suggest that economic historians should be cautious in 
regarding the degree of urbanization as an indicator of pre-modern economic growth where 
other evidence is lacking. Certain types of town deployed institutional and political power to 
benefit the urban economy by stifling rural competition, damaging wider economic growth.  
Our econometric analysis found a positive association between rural non-agricultural 
activities and a limited degree of landlord presence, but the relationship flattened out at 
higher levels and landlord presence reversed the otherwise positive effects of female headship 
and village mills. Our findings for early modern Bohemia do not imply that the second 
serfdom encouraged rural dynamism, since landlords were also attracted to villages by pre-
existing non-agricultural activities. Rather, the econometric relationships revealed by the 
Berní Rula illuminate the multiplicity and complexity of the bi-directional links between 
landlords’ rent-extraction and serfs’ economic decisions. The non-agricultural activities 
observed in seventeenth-century Bohemia arose overwhelmingly from the initiative of 
villagers themselves. Landlords permitted those non-agricultural activities by serfs from 
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which they themselves could extort rents, while stifling non-agricultural initiatives – such as 
those surrounding female household heads and village mills – that threatened manorial rent 
extraction. These wider unintended consequences of manorial interventions may help explain 
why Bohemia, like other societies in which landlords exercised strong institutional privileges, 
manifested a lower intensity of non-agricultural activity than western European economies 
during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’.  
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 Table 1: Summary statistics on characteristics of villages in Bohemia, Berni Rula, 1654  
Variable  No. obs.  Mean 
Std. 
dev.  Min  Max 
           
Share of non‐agricultural occupations  6,983  0.06 0.15  0.00 1.00
Number of holdings  6,983  11.44 10.79  1.00 133.00
Share of empty holdings  6,983  0.14 0.20  0.00 0.99
Total arable land of occupied holdings per holder  6,983  26.31 23.32  0.00 390.00
Number of working animals per holder  6,983  1.80 1.16  0.00 11.00
Number of (non‐working) cattle per holder  6,983  2.47 1.35  0.00 34.00
Share of ‘cottagers’  6,983  0.24 0.29  0.00 1.00
Share of ‘smallholders’  6,983  0.13 0.22  0.00 1.00
Share of ‘freemen’  6,983  0.02 0.13  0.00 1.00
Share of ‘peasants’  6,983  0.59 0.35  0.00 1.00
Share of Jews  6,983  0.001 0.03  0.00 1.00
Share of female household heads  6,983  0.032 0.10  0.00 1.00
Share of urban occupied holdings on estate   6,983  0.15 0.16  0.00 0.998
Presence of a mill  6,983  0.06 0.23  0.00 1.00
Share of holders with less than 15 strych of arable land  6,983  0.36 0.34  0.00 1.00
Presence of a holding held/used by landlord  6,983  0.07 0.25  0.00 1.00
Number of holdings held/used by landlord  6,983  0.15 0.80  0.00 19.00
Share of land held/used by landlord  6,910  0.02 0.09  0.00 1.00
Sources: See text.           
 
 
Table 2: Proportion of non-agricultural occupations, various European societies, 1381-c.1800 
Society Date 
Rural non-
agricultural 
(%) 
Total non-
agricultural 
(%) 
ENGLAND    
National estimate: 892 settlements a 1381  33.0 
Rutland (Cornwall) a 1522 22.8  
Coventry + Babergh + Rutland a 1522  31.8 
Myddle (agricultural village) b 1550 11.0  
National estimate c c.1710  50.2 
National estimate a,d 1755  56.0 
National estimate c c.1817  64.3 
NETHERLANDS    
National estimate e 1675  60.0 
Friesland e 1749 38.0 56.0 
Veluwe e 1749 34.0 53.0 
National estimate e c.1750  59.0 
Overijssel e 1795 40.0 54.0 
National estimate e c.1800  59.0 
POLAND    
Greater Poland f 1580 10.4  
Lesser Poland f 1580 12.3  
Mazowsze f 1580 6.9  
National estimate f 1580 10.2  
BOHEMIA    
Frýdlant villages (proto-industrial estate) g 1630 12.1 - 12.3  
Liberec villages (proto-industrial estate) g 1630 26.1 - 27.1  
Frýdlant villages (proto-industrial estate) g 1640-51 12.2 - 12.4  
National estimate: 6,983 villages h 1654 6.7 18.2 - 31.3 
Frýdlant villages (proto-industrial estate) g 1700-03 15.9 - 20.0  
Poděbrady villages (agricultural estate) i 1713 3.1  
Rychnov villages (proto-industrial estate) i 1713 9.6  
Poděbrady villages (agricultural estate) i 1719/1726 9.0  
Frýdlant villages (proto-industrial estate) g 1722 17.5  
Liberec villages (proto-industrial estate) g 1722 30.0  
ITALY (SOUTH)    
Santo Marco dei Cavoti (agro-town) j c.1750 < 10.0 10.0 
Locorotondo (agro-town) j c.1750 < 14.0 14.0 
FINLAND    
National estimate k 1754  21.3 
National estimate k 1769  19.8 
National estimate k 1805   17.9 
Sources: a Broadberry et al., ‘When’, pp. 17-19; b Coleman, Economy, p. 73; c Shaw-Taylor and 
Wrigley, ‘Occupational structure’, p. 59; d Shaw-Taylor, ‘Occupational structure’, p. 30 (‘plausible 
guess’); e De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, p. 525, 527; f Gieysztor, ‘Russie’, p. 
567; g Cerman & Štefanová, ‘Wirtschaft’, pp. 80, 82; h present paper (Table 1); i Matušíková and 
Pazderová, ‘Regionen’, p. 144; j Curtis, ‘Is there’, p. 399; k Mitchell, European, p. 163. 
Note: Excludes one observation for Rychnov villages in 1719, on the grounds that it involves an 85.9 
percentage-point rise in the 6 years since 1713, believed to reflect a discontinuity in record-keeping. 
 
 Table 3: Regression analysis of the determinants of non‐agricultural activity in rural Bohemia in 1654 (Tobit model)  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Size of village               
Number of holdings  0.00506***  0.00532***  0.00524***  0.00532***  0.00528***  0.00528***  0.00538*** 
  [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002] 
Share of empty holdings    ‐0.17913***  ‐0.18489***  ‐0.17898***  ‐0.17907***  ‐0.17210***  ‐0.15886*** 
    [0.00189]  [0.00209]  [0.00195]  [0.00187]  [0.00212]  [0.00185] 
Arable sector               
Total arable land of occupied holdings per holder  ‐0.00126***  ‐0.00120***  ‐0.00109***  ‐0.00105***  ‐0.00065***  ‐0.00066***  ‐0.00066*** 
  [0.00003]  [0.00003]  [0.00003]  [0.00003]  [0.00003]  [0.00003]  [0.00003] 
Share of holders with less than 15 strych of arable 
land          0.12113***  0.13028***  0.11964*** 
          [0.00139]  [0.00139]  [0.00140] 
Number of working animals per holder  ‐0.01565***  ‐0.01895***  ‐0.01839***  ‐0.01563***  ‐0.01206***  ‐0.01125***  ‐0.01260*** 
  [0.00046]  [0.00045]  [0.00048]  [0.00047]  [0.00046]  [0.00045]  [0.00046] 
Pastoral sector               
Number of (non‐working) cattle per holder  0.01127***  0.01274***  0.01241***  0.01171***  0.01145***  0.00970***  0.01107*** 
  [0.00025]  [0.00025]  [0.00031]  [0.00025]  [0.00024]  [0.00024]  [0.00024] 
Social composition               
Share of ‘cottagers’  0.16895***  0.17020***    0.18199***  0.11044***  0.09684***  0.10831*** 
  [0.00086]  [0.00094]    [0.00094]  [0.00122]  [0.00125]  [0.00122] 
Share of ‘smallholders’  0.30180***  0.29600***    0.30831***  0.21931***  0.20786***  0.21983*** 
  [0.00101]  [0.00103]    [0.00103]  [0.00143]  [0.00152]  [0.00144] 
Share of ‘freemen’        0.19886***  0.19401***  0.19991***  0.19478*** 
        [0.00142]  [0.00138]  [0.00137]  [0.00139] 
Share of Jews        0.92839***  0.82559***  2.89032***  0.81900*** 
        [0.00096]  [0.00149]  [0.00865]  [0.00144] 
Share of ‘peasants’      ‐0.22442***         
      [0.00141]         
Other village characteristics               
Presence of a mill  0.37044***  0.37027***  0.36835***  0.37112***  0.36825***  0.36339***  0.36705*** 
  [0.00134]  [0.00133]  [0.00140]  [0.00131]  [0.00131]  [0.00129]  [0.00131] 
Share of female household heads  0.07416***  0.06350***  0.06288***  0.06202***  0.06050***  0.04479***  0.05746*** 
  [0.00337]  [0.00343]  [0.00401]  [0.00351]  [0.00358]  [0.00367]  [0.00362] 
Share of occupied urban holdings on estate   ‐54.99152***  ‐54.95637***  ‐54.76271***  ‐59.15649***  ‐58.74909***  ‐59.50079***  ‐58.76000*** 
  [0.00235]  [0.00234]  [0.00275]  [0.00240]  [0.00232]  [0.00240]  [0.00233] 
Second serfdom proxy               
Presence of a holding held/used by landlord   0.06701***  0.09074***  0.09154***  0.09119***  0.09252***     
  [0.00045]  [0.00087]  [0.00088]  [0.00087]  [0.00087]     
Share of land held/used by landlord            0.22371***   
            [0.00296]   
Number of holdings held/used by landlord              0.00881*** 
              [0.00029] 
               
Constant  0.33350***  0.33148***  0.32181***  0.31116***  0.26489***  0.27629***  0.26950*** 
  [0.00083]  [0.00083]  [0.00100]  [0.00085]  [0.00083]  [0.00083]  [0.00083] 
               
Estate dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
               
N  6,836  6,836  6,836  6,836  6,836  6,768  6,836 
               
Log‐likelihood value  ‐1641  ‐1628  ‐1630  ‐1620  ‐1614  ‐1569  ‐1621 
Sigma  0.28166  0.28143  0.28093  0.28085  0.28005  0.27592  0.28043 
Pseudo‐R2  0.463  0.467  0.467  0.47  0.472  0.475  0.47 
Sources: See text.               
 
 Table 4: Regression analysis with second‐serfdom non‐linear terms (Tobit model)  
   (1)  (2) 
Size of village     
Number of holdings  0.00527***  0.00538*** 
  [0.00002]  [0.00002] 
Share of empty holdings  ‐0.17291***  ‐0.16995*** 
  [0.00254]  [0.00175] 
Arable sector     
Total arable land of occupied holdings per holder  ‐0.00067***  ‐0.00065*** 
  [0.00003]  [0.00003] 
Share of holders with less than 15 strych of arable land  0.13077***  0.11909*** 
  [0.00140]  [0.00139] 
Number of working animals per holder  ‐0.01121***  ‐0.01191*** 
  [0.00045]  [0.00046] 
Pastoral sector     
Number of (non‐working) cattle per holder  0.00972***  0.01103*** 
  [0.00024]  [0.00024] 
Social composition     
Share of ‘cottagers’  0.09693***  0.11132*** 
  [0.00125]  [0.00122] 
Share of ‘smallholders’  0.20835***  0.22109*** 
  [0.00160]  [0.00143] 
Share of ‘freemen’  0.19987***  0.19480*** 
  [0.00138]  [0.00138] 
Share of Jews  2.89413***  0.82525*** 
  [0.00877]  [0.00143] 
Other village characteristics     
Presence of a mill  0.36340***  0.36760*** 
  [0.00129]  [0.00132] 
Share of female household heads  0.04432***  0.05307*** 
  [0.00382]  [0.00360] 
Share of occupied urban holdings on estate   ‐59.50673***  ‐58.75377*** 
  [0.00239]  [0.00233] 
Second serfdom proxy     
Share of land held/used by landlord  0.30110***   
  [0.02567]   
(Share of land held/used by landlord)2  ‐0.12383***   
  [0.03252]   
Number of holdings held/used by landlord    0.04692*** 
    [0.00107] 
(Number of holdings held/used by landlord)2    ‐0.00544*** 
    [0.00013] 
     
Constant  0.27645***  0.26688*** 
  [0.00083]  [0.00083] 
     
Estate dummies  YES  YES 
     
N  6,768  6,836 
     
Log‐likelihood value  ‐1569  ‐1616 
Sigma  0.27597  0.28013 
Pseudo‐R2  0.475  0.471 
Sources: See text.     
 
 Table 5: Regression analysis with second‐serfdom interactions (Tobit model)  
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Size of village       
Number of holdings  0.00529***  0.00535***  0.00538*** 
  [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002] 
Share of empty holdings  ‐0.17952***  ‐0.16854***  ‐0.16955*** 
  [0.00187]  [0.00204]  [0.00184] 
Arable sector       
‐0.00065***  ‐0.00065***  ‐0.00066*** Total arable land of occupied holdings per holder 
[0.00003]  [0.00003]  [0.00003] 
Share of holders with less than 15 strych of arable 
land  0.12137***  0.12991***  0.11940*** 
  [0.00139]  [0.00140]  [0.00140] 
Number of working animals per holder  ‐0.01197***  ‐0.01031***  ‐0.01151*** 
  [0.00046]  [0.00046]  [0.00046] 
       
Pastoral sector       
Number of (non‐working) cattle per holder  0.01145***  0.00911***  0.01081*** 
  [0.00024]  [0.00024]  [0.00024] 
Social composition       
Share of ‘cottagers’  0.11107***  0.09928***  0.11085*** 
  [0.00122]  [0.00125]  [0.00122] 
Share of ‘smallholders’  0.21933***  0.20669***  0.21935*** 
  [0.00143]  [0.00155]  [0.00145] 
Share of ‘freemen’  0.19151***  0.19993***  0.19242*** 
  [0.00138]  [0.00137]  [0.00138] 
Share of Jews  0.83173***  2.88881***  0.82593*** 
  [0.00150]  [0.00867]  [0.00145] 
Other village characteristics       
Presence of a mill  0.37658***  0.36714***  0.37243*** 
  [0.00141]  [0.00140]  [0.00137] 
Share of female household heads  0.08723***  0.05810***  0.08220*** 
  [0.00500]  [0.00469]  [0.00469] 
Share of occupied urban holdings on estate   ‐58.80557***  ‐59.59143***  ‐58.84363*** 
  [0.00232]  [0.00241]  [0.00234] 
       
Second serfdom and its interactions       
‐0.13037***     Presence of a mill x presence of a holding held/used 
by landlord  [0.00569]     
‐0.36191***     Share of female household heads x  presence of a 
holding held/used by landlord  [0.03807]     
0.11517***     Presence of a holding held/used by landlord  
[0.00194]     
       
       
  ‐0.19433***   Presence of a mill x share of land held/used by 
landlord    [0.02745]   
  ‐1.22363***   Share of female household heads x share of land 
held/used by landlord    [0.16093]   
  0.30166***   
Share of land held/used by landlord     [0.00580]   
       
       
    ‐0.03528*** Presence of a mill x number of holdings held/used by 
landlord      [0.00273] 
    ‐0.26803*** Share of female household heads x number of 
holdings held/used by landlord      [0.01834] 
Number of holdings held/used by landlord       0.04987*** 
      [0.00114] 
       
Constant  0.26255***  0.27442***  0.26624*** 
  [0.00082]  [0.00083]  [0.00083] 
       
Estate dummies  YES  YES  YES 
       
N  6,836  6,734  6,802 
       
Log‐likelihood value  ‐1612  ‐1566  ‐1614 
Sigma  0.27987  0.27625  0.28072 
Pseudo‐R2  0.473  0.474  0.47 
Sources: See text.       
 
